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By unanimous decision, 
the Supreme Court of the Unit-
ed States, in Hurley v. Irish-
American Gay, Lesbian andBi-
sexual Group of Boston, 115 S. 
Ct. 2338 (1995), held that a 
Massachusetts public accom-
modations law violated First 
Amendment speech protections 
when employed to alter the con-
tent of private citizens' expres-
sive speech. In so holding, the 
Court declared the selection of 
participants by a private parade 
organization constituted pro-
tected expressive speech .. Con-
sequently, a state cannot com-
pel the inclusion of marchers 
whose message the parade or-
ganization does not wish to 
present. 
The petitioner, South 
Boston Allied War Veterans 
Council ("Council"), has spon-
sored the St. Patrick's Day pa-
rade in SouthBoston every year 
since 1947; no other group had 
applied for the permit in that 
time period. The City of Bos-
ton provided funds, use of its 
seal, and printing services to 
the Council. In 1992, the re-
spondent, Irish-American Gay, 
Lesbian and Bisexual Group of 
Boston ("GLm "), was created 
with the intent of marching in 
the parade to express their pride 
as openly gay individuals of 
Irish descent. Although the 
Council denied their applica-
tion for inclusion in the 1992 
parade, GLm participated with-
out incident under a state court 
order. 
Once again, the Coun-
cil denied GLm' s admittance 
in the 1993 parade. GLm re-
sponded by filing suit against 
the Council and its leader, John 
1. Hurley. GLm alleged, inter 
alia, violations of the United 
States and Massachusetts Con-
stitutions, as well as the state 
public accommodations law, 
which prohibited "any distinc-
tion, discrimination or restric-
tion on account of . . . sexual 
orientation . . . relative to the 
admission of any person to, or 
his treatment in any place of 
public accommodation, resort 
or amusement." Mass. Gen. 
Laws Ann. ch. 272 § 98 (West 
1990). The trial court deter-
mined that, due to the fact that 
the parade had traveled the same 
basic route for forty-seven years 
and provided entertainment to 
both marchers and spectators, 
the statutory defmition of a pub-
lic accommodation was satis-
fied. In rejecting the Council's 
claim that the parade was "pri-
vate," the trial court held the 
"lack of genuine selectivity in 
choosing participants ... dem-
onstrates that the Parade is a 
public event." App. to Pet. for 
Cert. B24. Further, the trial 
court rejected the Council's as-
sertion that GLm' s admission 
to the parade would violate the 
Council's First Amendment 
right of expressive association, 
holding that the required "focus 
on a specific message" was ab-
sent from the parade. Id. The 
trial court concluded that any 
infringement upon the Coun-
cil's First Amendment rights 
was minimal and was neces-
sary to promote the state's aim 
of eliminating discrimination. 
The Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts af-
firmed the trial court. The court 
held that it need not decide the 
Council's claim that the public 
accommodations law violated 
its freedom of speech as it agreed 
with the trial court's finding 
that the parade lacked an ex-
pressive purpose which would 
afford First Amendment pro-
tection. The court also rejected 
challenges that the public ac-
commodations law could be in-
terpreted as regulating speech 
and that the law was unconsti-
tutionally vague. The Supreme 
Court of the United States grant-
ed certiorari to determine 
whether a private parade orga-
nization's First Amendment 
rights are violated when a pub-
lic accommodations law is used 
to force the inclusion of a group 
of marchers whose viewpoint is 
not supported by the parade or-
ganization. 
In beginning its analy-
sis, the Court noted that GLIB 
presented neither a First 
Amendment claim nor an equal 
protection claim under the Four-
teenth Amendment. Hurley, 
115 S. Ct. at 2344. Therefore, 
according to the Court, GLIB's 
claim for inclusion in the pa-
rade rested solely upon the Mas-
sachusetts public accommoda-
tions law. Id. The Council's 
claim that their parade activity 
was a form of protected speech, 
however, imposed a constitu-
tional duty upon the Court to 
review the trial record de novo. 
Id. 
Next, the Court exam-
ined the expressive nature of 
parades and stated its use of the 
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word "parade" indicated a group 
of marchers making a collec-
tive point not only to fellow 
marchers, but to spectators 
along the parade path as well. 
Id. at 2345. The Court empha-
sized that protected expression 
goes beyond a parade's physi-
cal manifestations to its inher-
ent symbolism. Id. While ac-
knowledging that the Council's 
methods of choosing parade par-
ticipants were rather lenient, the 
Court held the Council's fail-
ure to present a cohesive mes-
sage, to edit a particular group's 
theme, or to originally create 
the messages presented, did not 
lead to forfeiture of constitu-
tional protection. Id. The Court 
noted that the First Amendment 
protects broadcast and print 
media in their selection of 
speech, created by others, for 
dissemination. Id. at 2345-46. 
Thus, the Council's selection 
of parade participants was enti-
tled to similar protection. Id. at 
2346. 
Subsequently, the Court 
narrowed its analysis to a de-
tailed review of the Massachu-
setts public accommodations 
law. The Court ruled that the 
public accommodations law 
was within the state's power to 
adopt, as it did not target speech 
or its content, but instead pro-
hibited discrimination against 
individuals attempting to buy 
or use publicly available goods 
and services. Id. at 2346-47. 
Instead, the Court took issue 
with the application of the law, 
noting that the Council dis-
claimed any intent to exclude 
individual homosexual or bi-
sexual members of groups ap-
proved to march, and no indi-
vidual member of GLIB 
claimed to be excluded from 
any approved groups. Id. at 
2347. Hence, the Court decid-
ed that the manner in which the 
state courts had enforced the 
law did not address the ultimate 
issue of whether GLIB, as an 
organization, could express a 
viewpoint not embraced by the 
parade organizers. Id. 
The Court held that the 
state court's application of the 
statute effectively forced the 
Council to alter the expressive 
content of its parade, as every 
group participating in the pa-
rade affects the message con-
veyed by the parade organizers. 
Id. The Court determined the 
state court's approach resulted 
in the Council's speech itself 
becoming the public accommo-
dation, thereby allowing any 
protected group to participate 
in shaping the Council's mes-
sage. Id. This, the Court ruled, 
was a clear violation of the 
Council's First Amendment 
rights. Id. '" Since all speech 
inherently involves choices of 
what to say and what to leave 
unsaid, '" the Court explained 
that, outside a commercial con-
text, a state cannot compel a 
speaker to affirm a belief in 
concepts he opposes. Id. (quot-
ing Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. 
Public Utils. Comm'n of Cal., 
475 U.S. 1, 11 (1986»(plurali-
ty opinion)( emphasis in origi-
nal). Consequently, the Court 
held that the Council could 
present any particular viewpoint 
it wished and exclude views to 
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which it did not subscribe; a 
choice lying outside the gov-
ernment's power to control. 
Hurley, 115 S. Ct. at 2348. 
GLIB, relying on Turn-
er Broadcasting System, Inc. v. 
FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445 
(1995)(limiting the autonomy 
of a monopolistic cable fran-
chise to allow survival ofbroad-
casters who might otherwise be 
silenced), responded by argu-
ing that admission to the parade 
would not threaten the Coun-
cil's autonomy. Hurley, 115 S. 
Ct. at 2348. Specifically, GLIB 
likened the Council to a "con-
duit" for the speech of the pa-
rade participants, rather than a 
speaker of the participants' 
messages. Id. The Court, in 
refusing to accept this analogy, 
reasoned that GLIB's partici-
pation and its message could be 
perceived as enjoying the Coun-
cil's support. Id. Thus, the 
Court held that when a view 
contrary to a speaker's own be-
liefs is forced upon the speaker, 
the speaker's autonomy has 
been compromised. Id. 
Furthermore, there was 
'" little risk that cable viewers 
would assume that the broad-
cast stations carried on a cable 
system convey ideas . . . en-
dorsed by the cable operator. ", 
Id. at 2348-49 (quoting Turner 
Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 
38 - U. 8alt. L.F ./26.1 
2465). In contrast to broadcast 
media, a parade does not con-
sist of individual messages 
which can be selectively 
viewed. Id. at 2349. In addi-
tion, no method exists which 
allows parade organizers to dis-
claim opposing viewpoints. Id. 
GLm's assertion that the Coun-
cil would be able to silence 
GLIB's message was unfound-
ed as GLIB had not attempted 
to obtain a parade permit on its 
own or demonstrated that the 
Council enjoyed a monopoly of 
access to parade spectators. Id. 
While recognizing that 
access to a speaker's message 
could ultimately produce speech 
free of bias toward particular 
classes of people, the Court 
found the rationale for applying 
the public accommodations law 
to expressive speech erroneous. 
Id. at 2350. The Court noted 
that our free speech traditions 
protect a safe haven from gov-
ernment interference for those 
expressing their views. Id. Fur-
thermore, the Court held that 
restricting speech to statements 
inoffensive to all people is the 
very antithesis of the First 
Amendment. Id. The Court 
concluded that though "the law 
is free to promote all sorts of 
conduct in place of harmful 
behavior, it is not free to inter-
fere with speech for no better 
reason than promoting an ap-
proved message or discourag-
ing a disfavored one, however 
enlightened either purpose may 
strike the government." Id. 
With its decision in 
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, 
Lesbian and Bisexual Group of 
Boston, the Supreme Court of 
the United States held that the 
First Amendment prevents a 
state from compelling alter-
ations in private expressive 
speech under the guise of elim-
inating discrimination. States, 
confronted with the task of elim-
inating prejudice, have resort-
ed to anti-discrimination stat-
utes in an effort to ensure the 
rights of protected classes of 
people are not trampled. The 
Hurley Court, however, con-
cluded that use of an anti-dis-
crimination statute to alter an 
individual's expressive speech 
to further the purpose of eradi-
cating bias intolerably strikes 
at the very heart of the First 
Amendment. Under Hurley, 
groups with controversial mes-
sages cannot rely on anti-dis-
crimination statutes in order to 
present their ideas in traditional 
forums. They must explore oth-
er available avenues of expres-
sion; otherwise, they may not 
be heard at all. 
-Paul J Wilson 
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